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Token-based proximity authentication methods that authenticate users based on physical proximity are effortless, but lack
explicit user intentionality, which may result in accidental logins. For example, a user may get logged in when she is near a
computer or just passing by, even if she does not intend to use that computer. Lack of user intentionality in proximity-based
methods makes them less suitable for multi-user shared computer environments, despite their desired usability benefits over
passwords. We present an authentication method for desktops called Seamless Authentication using Wristbands (SAW), which
addresses the lack of intentionality limitation of proximity-based methods. SAW uses a low-effort user input step for explicitly
conveying user intentionality, while keeping the overall usability of the method better than password-based methods. In SAW,
a user wears a wristband that acts as the user’s identity token, and to authenticate to a desktop, the user provides a low-effort
input by tapping a key on the keyboard multiple times or wiggling the mouse with the wristband hand. This input to the
desktop conveys that someone wishes to log in to the desktop, and SAW verifies the user who wishes to log in by confirming
the user’s proximity and correlating the received keyboard or mouse inputs with the user’s wrist movement, as measured
by the wristband. In our feasibility user study (n=17), SAW proved quick to authenticate (within two seconds), with a low
false-negative rate of 2.5% and worst-case false-positive rate of 1.8%. In our user perception study (n=16), a majority of the
participants rated it as more usable than passwords.
CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy → Authentication; • Human-centered computing → Ubiquitous and mobile
computing;
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1

INTRODUCTION

Authentication has become an integral part of computer usage, but it still remains an interruptive step in people’s
workflow. To authenticate to a computer, depending on the authentication method, users must exert mental
effort (e.g., recall their password) and/or physical effort (e.g., type their password). These factors increase the
cost of context switch for users – cost of switching attention from a primary task to the authentication step
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and back to the task – disrupting users’ workflow [53]. The disruption due to a single authentication instance
may be negligible, but it adds up, and depending on the authentication method and the nature of computer
usage, the disruption can vary from barely noticeable to time consuming and frustrating [34]. For example,
in some workplaces, such as hospital settings, where people typically log-in close to a hundred times daily at
different workstations, often for just a few moments, the disruption is significant; according to an industry report,
hospital staff spend about 30 to 45 minutes a day authenticating to computers and web applications [20]. As a
result, frustrated users devise workarounds to make the authentication process more convenient to get their
work done [1]. These workarounds include choosing simple passwords that are easy to remember and type,
writing them down on a piece of paper – ironically, some vendors sell special stickers to write a username and
password [25] – or choosing to disable authentication entirely, all of which leave the computer vulnerable [22, 50].
Rather than browbeating users to change their behavior, we need a secure authentication method that blends
seamlessly into users’ workflow. This work is largely motivated by the authentication challenges in multi-user
shared-desktop settings in hospitals and other enterprise environments [21, 50]. Because shared desktops are
prevalent in many enterprise environments, in this work we focus on authentication for desktop computers
(henceforth, simply ‘desktops’); the method could be easily adapted to laptops.
Proximity-based authentication methods (e.g., Apple Watch [4], Atama Sesame [6], ZIA [15]) are good candidates to build a usable, zero-effort, secure authentication solution, but they have two drawbacks: they do
not work well in multi-user shared settings and they may cause unintended authentications. Typically, in a
proximity-based authentication method, a user carries a wireless authentication token that is configured to
authenticate the user to a target computer, and whenever the user is within a certain distance of the target
computer – as determined by radio signal strength from the token – the user is automatically authenticated to the
computer; some implementations require an additional condition that there should be some input to the target
computer (presumably from the user) before the user is logged in, but there is no verification that the input was
indeed provided by the user being authenticated. Multi-user shared settings are problematic for proximity-based
methods because when there are multiple authorized users near a computer, all within the authentication distance
threshold, these methods cannot determine which user (if any) should be authenticated. The second problem with
proximity-based authentication methods is that a user may accidentally get authenticated without her consent,
e.g., when she may just be passing by or present in the next room (or cubicle). Furthermore, adversaries can
circumvent the distance threshold by using relay attacks [9, 44], and can get a user authenticated even if the user
is far outside the set authentication distance threshold; relay attacks have been demonstrated for Bluetooth [30],
RFID [17], and NFC [24].
The underlying cause for these shortcomings of proximity-based methods is that they do not require an explicit
intent from a user before the user is authenticated, i.e., a user does not have to explicitly convey that she wishes to
authenticate to the target computer. Instead, proximity-based methods infer user intentionality using proximity
based on the assumption that if a user is ‘near’ a computer, the user wants to log in that computer (or at least it is
okay to log in the user). The distance threshold for nearness depends on the underlying proximity protocol, and
can range from 20 cm (for NFC) to 10 m (for Bluetooth), but using relay attacks, an adversary can extend this range
by orders of magnitude [24, 30]. Thus, pure proximity-based authentication leaves a computer vulnerable when
the computer is used outside a physically secure environment or when used in a multi-user shared settings. In
this paper, we propose Seamless Authentication using Wristbands (SAW), an authentication method designed to
address this shortcoming of proximity-based authentication methods, and we do so by adding a quick low-effort
user input step that explicitly captures user intentionality for authentication.
In SAW, the user’s wristband (e.g., fitness tracker, smartwatch) acts as the user’s authentication token. To set
up the wristband, the user (or the user’s workplace IT staff) initializes the wristband with the user’s identity and
user-chosen PIN (e.g., by pairing [28] the wristband with a known trusted device that is set up to initialize SAW
wristbands), and then by pairing the wristband with the target desktop so they can communicate securely in the
Proc. ACM Interact. Mob. Wearable Ubiquitous Technol., Vol. 2, No. 3, Article 125. Publication date: September 2018.
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Desktop (D)
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Fig. 1. User Alice taps on the keyboard for authentication. The desktop correlates the received keystroke (keyboard data
stream) and the wrist movement (wristband data stream) to determine that Alice intends to authenticate, and authenticates
Alice.

future. Subsequently, to authenticate to the target desktop, the user simply taps a key on the keyboard multiple
times or wiggles the mouse with her wristband hand. Figure 1 illustrates how a user (Alice) authenticates to a
desktop by tapping a key few times with her wristband hand. The tapping or mouse-wiggle interaction, called
intent action, conveys to the target desktop that some user intends to authenticate and conveys to the user’s
wristband that the user intends to authenticate to some desktop. SAW correlates the timing of the keystroke (or
mouse wiggle) on the target desktop with the movement of all nearby wristbands to identify the user (among all
the nearby users) who performed the interaction and unlocks the target desktop for that user.
SAW uses a bilateral approach for authentication, an approach also used in prior work [33, 35–37]. In bilateral
authentication, a user is verified by comparing measurements from two independent sources – correlating
wristband movement with keyboard/mouse inputs in SAW’s case. The prior work closest to SAW is ZEBRA [35],
which uses a wristband for continuous authentication on a desktop. Compared to ZEBRA, SAW uses a different
authentication interaction and correlation technique that enable SAW to securely authenticate a user within 2 s
(ZEBRA takes 20 s); we discuss the differences in detail in Section 8.1.
Contribution. We propose SAW, a new proximity-based authentication method for desktop computers that
captures user intentionality for authentication. To identify the user interacting with the desktop, SAW leverages
the physical link established between the user’s wristband and the keyboard/mouse when the user interacts
with them. We identified and evaluated two potential low-effort authentication interactions (Mouse-wiggle and
Tap-5x) that could be used for authentication in SAW. Of the two interactions, Tap-5x performed better in terms
of time for authentication and accuracy. Using Tap-5x as the authentication interaction, we evaluate SAW’s
security under the standard Dolev-Yao adversary model [16]. We also evaluated SAW’s feasibility and usability
through two in-lab user studies (n=17,16). In the user studies, SAW had a low false-negative rate of 2.5% and a
low worst-case false-positive rate of 1.8%.

2

BACKGROUND

The type of settings we envision where SAW would be most effective are where proximity alone is not sufficient
to capture user intentionality to authenticate users.

2.1

User Intentionality for Authentication

User intentionality is an important principle of user authentication – a user should be authenticated to a computer
only if she intends to authenticate to that computer [43]. In authentication methods where a user manually
Proc. ACM Interact. Mob. Wearable Ubiquitous Technol., Vol. 2, No. 3, Article 125. Publication date: September 2018.

125:4

•

S. Mare et al.

provides authentication credentials (e.g., username and password, fingerprint), the act of providing the credentials
conveys the user’s intentionality, but in methods where credentials are wirelessly shared (e.g., proximity-based
methods), user intentionality is inferred and doing so incorrectly leads to security errors. Adding a user input
step to make user intentionality explicit in an otherwise zero-effort proximity-based authentication method while
keeping the overall method usable and non-disruptive to the user’s workflow is challenging.
To express authentication intent, a user needs to specify two things: 1) that the user intends to authenticate (to
something), and 2) the authentication target, the desktop the user wants to authenticate to. Naive approaches
where a user presses a button on her wristband conveys the user’s intent to authenticate, but does not indicate
which desktop the user intends to use – an approach that may be sufficient in a single-user single-desktop setting
where the user authenticates only to one desktop, but not in a multi-user shared-desktop environment where a
user can authenticate to multiple desktops. Another approach is where each desktop is assigned a unique number,
which is clearly displayed on each desktop’s display, and the user enters on her token the displayed number for
the desktop she intends to authenticate. Even if we assume that the token is easily accessible, say a wristband (or
a smartwatch), expressing intentionality this way is cumbersome: a user has to locate the number of the desktop,
raise her wrist, and input the number through the small interface.

2.2

Authentication in a Hospital Setting: Observations at a Local Hospital

To better understand the unique challenges in these environments, we reached out to a large local hospital, and
engaged the hospital IT staff and clinicians through meetings and interviews. Below we share our key learnings,
which further motivated this work and informed SAW’s design. We had several meetings with the Chief Medical
Information Officer (CIO), Information Security Manager, and Technical Compliance staff of a large local hospital.
Through our interactions, we learned the challenges they face around authentication and the workarounds
that hospital employees use, which echoed findings in prior work [21, 25]. To understand the authentication
challenges and workflows from the end user (nurses and clinicians) perspective, the lead author observed the
workflow of two nurses and two clinicians by shadowing them, and later conducted semi-structured interviews
with them. (The observation and interview protocol was approved by our university’s IRB.) When we visited the
hospital, the team was actually in their third month of piloting a NFC-based authentication solution, and we
were able to learn about their experience.
The workflow in the hospital varied a lot across departments. Some departments had more desktops, some
departments used more laptops; some departments had one desktop/laptop per user, whereas in some departments
users shared desktops and laptops. However, a common aspect of their workflow was a series of short computer
interactions (sometimes just for a few minutes), spread throughout their shifts. For example, in Out Patient
Departments, clinicians would visit patients in different examination rooms and would access the computer in
that room (which was either a desktop, a laptop brought in and set up by a nurse, or a laptop carried by the
clinician) while examining the patient, and after examination the clinician would go to another room to visit the
next patient and would access a computer there. This meant that if a nurse or a clinician was to log out every
time they were done with a session on their workstation, they would have to authenticate numerous times a day.
When asked if she logs out of her workstation after her session, a clinician said no, justifying “I would have to log
in 100 times a day!” Laptops were inconvenient to carry, but still nurses and clinicians preferred them because
it meant they could log out (and log in) less, but because laptops were inconvenient to carry everywhere, they
would often get left behind (and unattended) while the user went across the hall to do some task. We found two
instances where laptops were left logged in and unattended.
The feedback from nurses and clinicians based on a three-month pilot of a NFC-based authentication solution
was mixed. “We had lot of challenges. If it worked as designed it won’t be a big deal,” the CIO said while referring to
the system integration challenges they faced. An IT staff echoed the sentiment “It just doesn’t work as advertised”
Proc. ACM Interact. Mob. Wearable Ubiquitous Technol., Vol. 2, No. 3, Article 125. Publication date: September 2018.
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Fig. 2. An overview of SAW authentication.

while referring to instances when users could not authenticate using the new system. The NFC-based solution
used a different radio frequency (RF) compared to what the hospital was using for their RF-based access-control
systems. So the existing RFID cards could not be used, and new cards were bought. The pilot users now had
(at least) two cards attached to their lanyard, which presented another problem: when a user would put their
lanyard cards in front of the reader, sometimes the reader would not detect the card if was behind another card.
We learned that several pilot users had reported this issue and the hospital was considering buying NFC cards
that support both frequencies. Another concern the IT staff had with NFC cards was users misplacing or leaving
their cards behind, and the cards getting stolen. So the staff had employed a tiered approach to authentication,
where a user authenticates with their password and their NFC card, and after which for the next 5 hours (half a
shift time) the user could authenticate with only the NFC card (i.e., without their password), if they wished. Other
hospitals, as we learned, address this concern by requiring a 4-digit PIN along with each NFC card login. Given
the difficulties with an NFC-based solution (even in settings that already use RFID cards), professionals’ concerns
around loss and misuse of NFC cards, and NFC’s inherent vulnerability to range-extension attacks [18, 24], there
remains a need for a secure usable authentication method.

3

SAW OVERVIEW

The intuition behind SAW is that a user’s fine wrist movements that produce taps on the keyboard or move the
mouse should strongly correlate with the keyboard taps or mouse movements, and based on the timing of the
actions (wrist movement and taps/mouse movement) they should be uniquely linkable, allowing us to tie the user’s
wristband movement to the taps on the keyboard or movement of the mouse of a specific desktop. Further, we can
link the wristband to the wearer’s identity, using a variety of known methods (e.g., using PIN [4] or biometric [14]),
thus linking the user to the keyboard tap for the purposes of authentication. This correlation should be unique
and difficult to forge (mimic by an adversary) because it involves unpredictable fine human motor actions that
are difficult to observe and imitate in real time; average human reaction time is about 215 ms [47], and in SAW
the correlation time threshold is 50 ms.
Figure 2 shows an overview of how SAW works. A user performs a pre-defined intent action on the desktop
(i.e., provides inputs on a keyboard and/or mouse). The intent action is detected by the desktop and the wristband
independently. The desktop detects the action using keyboard/mouse inputs, the wristband detects the action
using the data from the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors. The desktop then temporally compares the two
intent actions (the intent action it detected and the intent action detected by the wristband) to determine whether
they correlate, and if they do, the user is authenticated and logged in. Otherwise, the user has to try again, either
with SAW or using the fallback authentication method (e.g., username and password).
The usability of SAW depends on the usability of the intent action. Our approach to keep the intent action
quick and easy to perform was to build it around simple desktop interactions that are familiar to users. If we
break down the steps involved in accessing a typical desktop, there are three steps: a) invoke the login screen on
Proc. ACM Interact. Mob. Wearable Ubiquitous Technol., Vol. 2, No. 3, Article 125. Publication date: September 2018.
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Tap a key five times

(f) Tap-5x

Fig. 3. Intent actions that we considered for SAW. All interactions are performed with the wristband hand.

a locked desktop, b) enter username and password, and c) start using the desktop. To invoke the login screen,
users perform simple actions such as tapping a key once or multiple times, clicking the mouse, or moving the
mouse. Since these actions are already part of users’ workflow, intent actions built around these actions could
blend easily in their workflow. So, based on these actions that users often perform, we considered six different
intent actions to use in SAW. Figure 3 shows a sketch of how these six interactions were performed.
(1) Mouse-random-move: Move the mouse arbitrarily for a few seconds.
(2) Mouse-double-click: Click twice on the mouse button.
(3) Tap-2x: Tap a key twice (double tap).
(4) Mouse-draw: Draws a specified shape (e.g., rectangle, circle) on the display with the mouse.
(5) Mouse-wiggle: Wiggle the mouse side-to-side for a few seconds with a locked wrist.
(6) Tap-5x: Tap a key (any key) on the keyboard five or more times.
To identify potential intent actions, we conducted two small exploratory pilot studies where we asked five
volunteers to perform these actions while we recorded the wrist movement and desktop inputs. Our goal was to
study the wristband movement data before, during, and after these actions are performed, to identify which of
these intent actions can be reliably detected from the wristband movement data. In our initial experiments, we
considered Mouse-random-move, Mouse-double-click, and Tap-2x, but all of these actions proved difficult to
identify from wrist movement data. The duration for Mouse-double-click and Tap-2x was too short, which made
it difficult to isolate that action in the wristband movement data, especially when the wrist moves immediately
before and after the action. Mouse-random-move was relatively long (about 2 seconds or more), but throughout
the action most participants’ wrists were relatively stationary and the movement of the mouse and the wrist
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was not significant enough, which makes correlation hard. In the second pilot study, we experimented with
Mouse-draw, Mouse-wiggle, and Tap-5x. Mouse-draw required participants to move the mouse over a large shape
drawn on the display so as to cause some wrist movement, and the data seemed promising for correlation, but
this action was slow compared to Mouse-wiggle and Tap-5x, and also required visual attention, so we did not
study this action further. Mouse-wiggle and Tap-5x were easy to identify in the wristband movement data and
they did not require any visual attention, which makes it easy to perform these actions. Because Mouse-wiggle
and Tap-5x proved most promising in our initial analysis, we use them as authentication interactions in SAW.

3.1

Design Goals

As a potential solution, SAW has the following usability (U*) and security (S*) goals (with Section numbers where
we evaluate these goals):
U1 Accurate: SAW should be accurate in identifying the user when she intends to authenticate the desktop (Section 6.1).
U2 No-need-to-memorize: SAW should not require the user to memorize any secret (Section 6.2.1).
U3 Quick: SAW should be quick to unlock a desktop; we aim for authentication with SAW to be within one to
two seconds (Section 6.2.2).
U4 User-agnostic: SAW should not depend on how the user performs the authentication interaction. If the user’s
authentication interaction behavior changes, SAW should still be able to authenticate the user (Section 6.2.3).
U5 Low-effort and Easy-to-perform: SAW should require no (or minimal) physical effort and should be easy to
perform (Section 6.2.4).
S1 Requires-explicit-intent: SAW should require a user to explicitly express her intent for authentication (Section 6.3).
S2 Resilient-to-physical-observation: SAW should not leak any secret information to an adversary that is capable
of physically observing the user during authentication. The adversary can video or audio record the user
during authentication (Section 6.3).
S3 Resilient-to-accidental-logins: SAW should be resilient to accidental logins, i.e., a user should not be authenticated without her consent (Section 6.3.1).
S4 Resilient-to-mimic-attack: The way SAW authenticates a user makes it susceptible to mimicking attacks, so
SAW should be resilient against mimicking attacks (Section 6.3.2).

3.2

System Assumptions

We make following assumptions in SAW to get the data required for authentication.
A1 Wristband: The user wears a wristband that has accelerometer and gyroscope sensors and a radio (e.g.,
Bluetooth) to communicate to the target desktop.
A2 Paired: The wristband is already paired with the target desktop, a one-time activity, using a secure pairing
method [28, 31].
A3 Wristband wear detection: The wristband can detect when it is worn and when it is taken off from the wrist.
This can be achieved for example, using an optical sensor as used in Apple Watch [4] or a sensor attached
to the clasp that triggers when the watch is worn or taken off. The wristband is securely associated to its
wearer (to prevent any unintended sharing) by detecting when it is taken off and requiring the wearer,
when she dons the wristband, to reconfirm her identity using a PIN (as on the Apple Watch [4]), using a
biometric (like bioimpedance [14]), or any other convenient and secure method.
A4 No hardware or software tampering: The adversary does not tamper with the hardware or software of the
target desktop and the user’s wristband. Our goal for SAW is to be as secure as password. If an adversary
can tamper with the desktop, the adversary can also easily capture the user’s password.
Proc. ACM Interact. Mob. Wearable Ubiquitous Technol., Vol. 2, No. 3, Article 125. Publication date: September 2018.
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Adversary and Threat Model

For SAW, we consider a Dolev-Yao adversary who has physical access to the target desktop and can observe (and
even record) the user when the user is in radio proximity of the target desktop. (Under the Dolev-Yao model [16],
the adversary has complete control over the communication channel between the desktop and wristband, but
the adversary is computationally bounded, i.e., cannot break cryptographic primitives.) The adversary may be
a curious family member, friend, colleague, or even an authorized user of the target desktop. The goal of the
adversary is to log in as the user, but we assume the adversary cannot spoof the user’s wristband. Thus, the
adversary attempts to log in as the user by performing the intent action on the target desktop in a way that
would fool SAW. For a given desktop input, whether SAW authenticates the adversary as the user depends on the
user’s wristband movement data when the intent action was performed. So depending on ‘where the user is’
(within radio proximity of the desktop or away) and ‘what the user is doing’ (sitting, walking, authenticating on
a nearby desktop) when the adversary attempts his attack, we consider three types of scenario.
(1) Accidental login: In this attack, the adversary waits for an opportunity when the user is in radio proximity
of the target desktop. The user could be sitting, walking, writing, or working on another desktop, but the
user is not attempting to log in to another computer. The adversary attempts to authenticate (as the user)
to the target desktop. (The attacker may employ range-extending techniques to falsely indicate the user’s
presence near the target desktop.)
(2) Mimic attack without wireless jamming: In this attack, the adversary waits for an opportunity when the user
is in radio proximity and is attempting to authenticate to another nearby desktop. This attacker monitors
the user’s attempt to authenticate to a nearby desktop using a side-channel (e.g., visual, audio) and attempts
to authenticate (as the user) to the target desktop by mimicking the user’s intent action. To match the
timing of the user’s intent action, the adversary may also anticipate when the user’s wrist will move in a
pattern similar to the intent action.
(3) Mimic attack with wireless jamming: This attack is similar to the previous one, but in this attack, the
adversary can cause wireless interference and selectively jam any communication to and from the user’s
wristband. We consider this as a separate attack because the ability to jam wireless communication affects
the adversary’s chance of success.

4

SAW: METHOD

To use a wristband with SAW for authentication on a target desktop, the wristband should be paired with the
target desktop (Assumption A2, Section 3.2), and activated with the user’s identity. Wearing a paired and activated
wristband, a user approaches the target desktop and performs an intent action (i.e., Tap-5x or Mouse-wiggle) to
log in. Below we discuss the protocol and method to identify the user (among multiple nearby users) who should
be authenticated and logged in to the target desktop.

4.1

Intent Action and Correlation Events

An intent action generates two data signals, one in the desktop in the form of keyboard or mouse inputs, and
another in the wristband in the form of wrist-movement data. Intuitively, since there is one source for both
the signals, they should correlate. Existing applications that leverage human action to authenticate or pair two
devices compare the same type of signals, e.g., accelerometer data [37] or Wi-Fi measurements [36]. In SAW, the
two signals are fundamentally different, which makes it difficult to compare them directly.
The intent actions we chose involve specific events that can be measured in both the signals, and using the
timing of each events we show that we can link the two signals and identify the user (the wristband) that
performed the intent action. We call these specific events correlation events, and the moments in the intent action
related to these correlation events as correlation points. Figure 4 shows correlation points (red circular dots) along
Proc. ACM Interact. Mob. Wearable Ubiquitous Technol., Vol. 2, No. 3, Article 125. Publication date: September 2018.
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Fig. 4. Sample Mouse-wiggle and Tap-5x interactions with correlation points marked in red circular dots. Solid line is
acceleration data (along one axis) from the wristband; dotted line is mouse pointer displacement (in pixels) alone x-axis; and
the shaded region indicates the duration of a tap (keystroke), from KeyDown and KeyUp.

accelerometer data stream and desktop input stream from sample Mouse-wiggle and Tap-5x actions. In Figure 4,
the figure at the top shows a Mouse-Wiggle action in which a participant wiggled the mouse side-to-side. The
dotted line shows the mouse displacement (in pixels) along the direction of the wiggle (x-axis of the mouse), and
the wrist data is linear acceleration along the x-axis of the wristband, which happened to align with the x-axis of
the mouse. The figure on the bottom shows Tap-5x action, where a participant pressed the spacebar key five
times. The highlighted region shows the duration of the keypress (i.e., KeyDown to KeyUp event) for each tap.

4.2

Protocol

There are six steps in the SAW protocol, as described below and shown in Figure 5. The figure also shows the
wristband activation step, where Alice activates the wristband when she wears it at the start of her workday.
After activating the wristband, the wristband serves as her authentication token, henceforth named as Alice’s
Wristband.
Bootstrapping Secure Communication. During the wristband activation step, Alice pairs her wristband with
the target desktop, and as part of the pairing process, the desktop and the wristband share their public keys Kd
and Kw , respectively, with each other. (In an enterprise setting, wristbands might be paired with desktops using a
centralized system.) Using these keys, the desktop and the wristband establish a secure communication when
they are in radio proximity. SAW uses established protocols like SlyFi [19] to prevent replay and MITM attacks,
and for source authenticity (i.e., verifying the source of a message). With SlyFi, when Alice arrives within the
radio proximity of the desktop, Alice’s wristband and the target desktop establish a session key (kws ) using the
public keys they had shared during the pairing process. This session key, which is shared only between the target
desktop and Alice’s wristband, is used to secure their communication, and the desktop thereby uses this key to
bind any communication with Alice to Alice’s identity, for the duration of this session. The following protocol
describes how user verification works in SAW.
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Fig. 5. SAW protocol. Numbers correspond to the steps in the protocol; the messages with the same number (but different
letter) represent different responses the desktop/wristband can send when it receives a message, depending on their state
and received message (e.g., when the wristband receives 3a, it sends either 4a or 4b depending on whether the user should be
authenticated).

(0) Initial step: The authentication process is initiated when a locked desktop D detects keyboard or mouse
input that resembles the intent action.
(1) Query step: Desktop D sends a query message to wristbands in radio proximity with start and end times
(ts , te ) of the intent action relative to message transmission time, where ts < te < 0. The receiving wristband
extracts wrist movement data in the time window (tr x + ts , tr x + te ), where tr x is the message receive time.
We consider wristbands only within 10 meters (standard Bluetooth range), determined using radio range,
as candidate wristbands; this simple proximity threshold (filter) is an optimization in the protocol, and
could be further constrained or relaxed depending on particular application use cases.
(2) Candidate response step: Among the nearby wristbands, each wristband determines if it is a candidate for
this request (Section 4.4). If a wristband is a candidate, it detects the intent action in the extracted motion
data and computes a set of correlation points Aw corresponding to the intent action (Section 4.5), which is
then sent to the desktop for correlation with the desktop’s intent action sequence Ad ; if the wristband is
not a candidate, it sends Aw as an empty set.
(3) Correlation step: Desktop D correlates all the wristband sequences (Aw ) it receives with its own intent
action sequence (Ad ) to find the best-matching sequences.
(3a) If D finds only one match with high confidence, D sends a successful correlation message Ms to that
wristband indicating that the user can be authenticated.
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(3b) If the correlation fails for a sequence received from a wristband, D sends a failure message M f to that
wristband indicating failed authentication.
(3c) Disambiguation step: If, on the other hand, there are two (or more) wristbands that correlate with the
intent action, D asks those users to repeat the intent action by sending a retry message Mr . Alternatively,
D can fall back to a default authentication method like username and password.
(4) Wristband confirmation step: In this step the wristband confirms to the desktop that the user should be
authenticated. This step ensures that the user is not authenticated to multiple desktops at the same time. In
a many-to-one use case (many users, one desktop), a wristband can be a candidate for only one desktop. In
a many-to-many use case, a wristband might be a candidate for two (or more) desktops; such a wristband
sends its motion data to all such desktops, and waits for their response.
(4a) If the candidate wristband receives a message Ms from only one desktop, it responds with an okay-toauthenticate message Ma , which includes Alice’s identity.
(4b) If the candidate wristband receives Ms from multiple desktops, the candidate wristband denies authentication to all desktops with a retry message Mr , indicating that the desktops should ask the user to
authenticate again, as in the step 3c.
(4c) If the candidate wristband does not receive Ms , but receives M f or Mr , it alerts the user, indicating that
an authentication attempt was made and it failed, and she should try again.
(5) Desktop confirmation step: After D receives Ma from a wristband and it is ready to authenticate, it sends a
message Mack requesting a final confirmation from the wristband to authenticate the user.
(6) User authentication: The wristband sends an ACK confirming that the user can be authenticated. The
wristband can also be configured to alert the user that she has been logged in to desktop D, or require a
confirmation from the user before sending the final ACK to the desktop.
We assume the communication between the wristband and the desktop is reliable, i.e., the underlying MAC or
other protocol layer in the communication stack handles message failures and guarantees message delivery. If the
communication breaks between the wristband and the desktop, the authentication protocol aborts and the user is
not authenticated by SAW. We discuss how this protocol helps achieve SAW’s security goals in Section 6.3.

4.3

Desktop Intent Action Detector

When a locked desktop receives keyboard or mouse input, it determines whether the input is an intent action,
i.e., Tap-5x or Mouse-wiggle. When a desktop is unlocked (i.e., some user logged in), it does not look for intent
actions, and hence, does not initiate the authentication protocol even if an intent action is deliberately provided.
Detecting an intent action on desktop is straightforward: Tap-5x is a sequence of five (or more) keystrokes on the
same key in quick succession; Mouse-wiggle is a rapid side-to-side displacement of the mouse pointer along the
x-axis with small displacement (if any) along the y-axis.
On receiving an intent action, the target desktop initiates the authentication protocol by sending a query
message Mq to all the nearby wristbands. (Desktops that support SAW keep track of the wristbands that are in
radio proximity.) The query message Mq = (A, ts , te ) includes the type of action (A, Tap-5x or Mouse-wiggle),
and the start and end times (ts , te ) of the action relative to when the query message is transmitted; the receiving
wristband extracts the motion sensor data corresponding to this action by adding the relative start and end times
to the message receive time. If Ts ,Te are the start and end time of the intent action and Tt x is the time when the
desktop transmits the query message, ts = Ts − Tt x and te = Te − Tt x .
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Wristband Intent Action Detector

When a wristband receives a query message from a nearby desktop, it extracts motion data, determines whether
the user is a candidate for authentication, and if the user is, the wristband proceeds to compute the correlation
points that may correspond to the intent action.
Data Extraction. A wristband in SAW is always sensing motion data and keeps a buffer of the past 10 seconds,
similar to fitness trackers and smartwatches. Based on the received message Mq = (A, ts , te ) at time Tr x , the
wristband extracts accelerometer and gyroscope data between the time window Tr x + ts − ϵ and Tr x + te , where ϵ
is to account for possible communication delays and clock skews (in SAW, we use ϵ = 0.5 s). The extracted motion
sensor data should include the wristband movement during the intent action, but it does not have to precisely
match the duration of the intent action. In other words, the extracted data can contain wristband movement data
before or after the intent action, but it should encompass the intent action. The ϵ parameter ensures that the
extracted data does include the start of the intent action, so that the desktop can determine whether the user is a
candidate for authentication.
Candidate Detection. The candidate detection step determines whether the user intends to authenticate to a
desktop, any desktop. There can be multiple authorized users near a target desktop, and this step acts as the
first filter to eliminate users with wrist movement significantly different compared to a movement from a wrist
that performs an intent action. Being a candidate user does not mean that this user is the one who provided
the intent action on the target desktop. It implies that the user’s wrist movement is similar to an intent-action
wrist movement, and it is likely that the user performed an intent action. Whether the user’s intent action is the
same as the intent action on the target desktop determines whether the candidate user is the one who should be
authenticated and logged in, and this is determined in the correlation step (Section 4.5).
SAW uses an activity classifier to identify wrist movement that looks similar to a wrist movement corresponding
to intent actions; the classifier is trained to recognize ‘walking’, ‘stationary’, ‘writing’, ‘other physical activity’,
and specific intent actions, ‘Tap-5x’ and ‘Mouse-Wiggle’. The wristband computes the classification feature vector
from the extracted sensor data and feeds it to the classifier. If the data is classified as one of the intent actions, the
wristband (and its user) is considered as a candidate for authentication, and the wristband extracts correlation
points from the sensor data. If the data is classified as a different activity, it implies that the user did not express
an intent to authenticate, and should not be authenticated. To build the intent detection classifier, we use a
Random Forest Classifier [12] and standard activity recognition features [27]. To train the classifier, we used
Tap-5x and Mouse-Wiggle samples from our experiments, and for ‘walking’, ‘stationary’, ‘writing’, and ‘other
physical activity’ we used wrist movement data collected from two volunteers who performed these activities
while wearing a wristband.
Correlation Event Detection. For Tap-5x, the correlation events are key-press down (KeyDown) or key release
(KeyUp) events, and for Mouse-Wiggle, the correlation events are the 180 degree changes in the mouse trajectory.
These events generate small but sudden changes in wrist movement or rotation, which appear as peaks or troughs
in the accelerometer and gyroscope sensor data. Thus, the wristband represents an intent action as a sequence of
timestamps of peaks and/or troughs that likely correspond to the correlation events.
Depending on the wristband orientation and how the user performs the intent action, the peaks (or troughs)
may appear as more prominent in one axis than others. So we find correlation points along each individual axis
(x, y, z) in accelerometer (a) and gyroscope (д) signals; in total, we get twelve sequences, from six axes and a
sequence of peaks (p) and troughs (t) for each axis. Thus the set Aw consists of twelve sequences representing
the intent action:
p

p

t
t
Aw = {S ax , S ax
, . . . , Sдz , Sдz
}
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Intent Action Correlation

The desktop’s intent action set Ad contains two sequences (KeyUp and KeyDown events for Tap-5x, and peaks and
troughs for Mouse-Wiggle) that represent the intent action; the wristband’s intention action set Aw contains
twelve sequences. We do a pair-wise matching of sequences in both sets, compute the correlation score for a pair,
and use the highest correlation score to determine whether Ad and Aw represent the same intent action, and
whether the wristband user should be authenticated.
For a given pair of sequences of timestamps R (from the desktop) and S (from the wrist), this correlator module
generates a correlation score to quantify how well the two sequences correlate. If the two sequences are of same
length, then aligning and matching them is straightforward. The wrist signal, however, is noisy and may have
more or fewer peaks (or troughs) than what we expect (|R| , |S |), in which case we want to match corresponding
timestamps – timestamps that are closest to each other – in both sequences while penalizing missing or extra
timestamps in the S sequence. Fortunately, the problem of sequence matching is well studied in bioinformatics.
We adapt the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm, which is used to align protein sequences [40]. Given two sequences,
the algorithm produces two aligned sequences with the maximum similarity score, for a given scoring matrix.
For example, for sequences ABCDEF and ABCGF the algorithm would output ABCDEF and ABC–GF as the two
aligned sequences. A similarity score for the sequences ABCDEF and ABC–GF is determined by comparing letters
at each position: if two letters are the same, it is a match and a positive match value is added to the similarity
score; if two letters are different (E and G at fifth position), it is a mismatch and a mismatch penalty is added to
the similarity score; if there is an insertion or deletion (D and – at fourth position), a gap penalty is added to the
similarity score. The match value, mismatch penalty, and gap penalty are defined by a predefined scoring matrix.
The Needleman-Wunsch algorithm determines the best alignment using dynamic programming.
In SAW we use a variation of this algorithm to align two sequences of timestamps R and S. Two timestamps, t 1
and t 2 are considered a match if |t 1 − t 2 | ≤ τ , where τ is the matching threshold; if the timestamp difference is
greater than τ , they are considered mismatched. In the scoring matrix, a match is 1, a gap is −0.5, and a mis-match
is −1. The algorithm computes the similarity score for the aligned sequences as the sum of all matches (number of
matches × match score), all gaps (number of gaps in both sequences × gap penalty), and all mis-matches (number
of mis-matches × mis-match penalty). We normalize this score by dividing it by the maximum possible similarity
score for sequence R with any other sequence S. We use the normalized similarity score as the correlation score, c,
where c = 1 indicates perfect correlation between the user’s wrist movement and the keyboard or mouse inputs.
If the correlation score is greater than the correlation threshold, τc (c ≥ τc ), we consider the correlation good
enough to authenticate the user.

5

DATA COLLECTION

We conducted two in-lab studies to evaluate SAW. The first study collected data to test the feasibility of the idea,
and the second study sought to understand usability and user perception about SAW. Both the studies were
approved by our university’s IRB. (As noted above, we also conducted two pilot studies to explore different intent
actions, before choosing Tap-5x and Mouse-Wiggle.)

5.1

Study 1: Feasibility Study

We recruited 17 participants for the feasibility study: ten male and seven female; eleven graduate students, four
undergraduate students, and two college employees. We asked participants to wear a Shimmer device [49] –
the SAW wristband for the purpose of our study. We sampled the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors in the
Shimmer at 512 Hz, and streamed the sensor data to a desktop in real time, where it was logged to a file. To
capture keyboard inputs to the desktop, we wrote a Python script that intercepts keyboard and mouse inputs
from the desktop OS and logs them; we used Apple iMac desktops in both the user studies.
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Wearing the Shimmer, each participant performed 20 interactions for each of the two intent actions (Mousewiggle and Tap-5x), with a brief pause between each repetition. All actions were performed with the wristband
hand; participants could choose either hand to wear the wristband. For Mouse-wiggle, we instructed the participants to ‘move the mouse side to side for a few seconds’, and for Tap-5x, we instructed the participants to
‘Tap a key, any key, on the keyboard five times’. We did not demonstrate or give them any specific instruction
on how to perform taps or wiggle the mouse; we wanted to capture participants’ natural interactions. We did,
however, instruct them to assume that the desktop display is off and they have to wake up the display with
their interactions; we envision SAW being used in this way. We collected two types of data for the Tap-5x and
Mouse-Wiggle interactions performed by the participants: a) the participant’s wrist movement, captured by the
Shimmer, and b) the keyboard and mouse inputs received by the desktop, intercepted by the script we wrote.
Separately, we recruited two volunteers to wear Shimmer on their wrist and collected data for 10 min while
sitting still on a chair (“sitting” activity); for 10 min while walking (“walking” activity); for 30 min while using
a computer (“PC use” activity); and for 50 min while performing different activities (moving around, writing,
reading, eating, etc.; “other” activity). We collected only 10 min data for sitting and walking activity, because that
was enough to characterize those simple activities.

5.2

Study 2: User Perception Study

We recruited 16 participants for our second user study: ten male and six female; eight undergraduate students and
eight graduate students. The goal of this study was to learn about users’ perception of the usability and security of
SAW. Participants were asked to fill out a survey about their demographic information and their current preferred
authentication method. After the initial survey, participants were asked to perform 30 authentication attempts
with three different authentication methods (discussed below). We then conducted a brief (15 min) semi-structured
interview with the participants to gain insight into what they liked and disliked about each method. We took
notes summarizing participant responses and writing direct quotes. Finally, the participants were asked to fill out
a modified systems usability scale (SUS) survey for each of the three authentications methods. We modified the
SUS survey [13] by changing ‘system’ to ‘method’, and removing the question ‘I found the various functions in
this system were well integrated’, because it was not applicable to our authentication methods.
Participants are known to be biased in user studies and they try to give answers they expect the researcher
desires [8]. To reduce this bias we chose participants who were not aware of this work, and had not participated
in the feasibility study; we did not inform the participants that were evaluating a method that we developed.
Instead, we told participants that we were evaluating two potential authentication methods that other researchers
have proposed: 1) a mouse-based method (a fictitious method based on mouse movement dynamics, a behavioral
biometric method), and 2) a tap-based method (SAW). We explained to the participants how both methods work.
In the mouse-based method two objects are shown on the screen and the user drags one object over another;
the user is authenticated based on how she moves the mouse – her unique mouse movement signature. In the
tap-based method the user has to wear a wristband (which acts as the user’s identity) and the user taps a key five
times; the user is authenticated based on the timings of the taps that the wristband determines from the wrist
motion and sends it to the desktop. We told participants that we are collecting data to study the feasibility of
these methods and to get their feedback on their perception of the usability and security of these two methods.
In addition to the two authentication methods, we also asked participants to perform authentication attempts
with a username and password, as a baseline for comparison. We simulated the authentication environment
through a browser, where the participant was shown a webpage asking him/her to do a task and then click the
login button to authenticate; the webpage had written instructions for the task. For username and password
method, the task was to enter a username and password (chosen at the start of the experiment); for the mousebased method, the task was to drag one rectangle (specified on the webpage and always the same rectangle)
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over the second rectangle (both rectangles always appeared in same location on the webpage); and for the
tap-based method, the task was to tap a key five times (any key; most users chose the space bar). We informed
the participants that we would be timing each authentication attempt. During the experiment, the participants
were asked to perform 30 attempts, 10 for for each method, in a randomized sequence (the sequence was same
for each participant).

6

EVALUATION

SAW’s goals are to be provide users with a quick and easy way to express their intent for authentication. Based
on the data from the user studies, we evaluate how accurately SAW captures user intent (Section 6.1), its usability
(Section 6.2), and that SAW indeed prevents accidental logins and raises the bar for adversaries to mimic and
spoof the user (Section 6.3).

6.1

Feasibility

To evaluate SAW, we fed it with a number of test cases generated from the feasibility study (Section 5.1); a test
case is a combination of wristband motion data (W) and desktop input data (D). Some of the test cases are positive,
where W and D from the same action perform by the same participant, and some are negative, where W and D
from different actions performed by same or different participant. SAW evaluates all the test cases and labels
them as positive or negative. A perfect system would correctly label all positive test cases as positive and all
negative test cases as negative. We use false-negative rate and false-positive rate as our metrics for evaluation.
False-negative rate (FNR) is the fraction of positive test cases that SAW misidentified as negative. FNR tells us
how effective a method is at authenticating users, in other words, how frequently the method makes an error
and denies access to a user; we want FNR close to zero. False-positive rate (FPR) is the fraction of negative test
cases that SAW misidentified as positive. FPR tells us how effective a method is at stopping adversaries, in other
words, how frequently the method makes an error and accidentally grants an unauthorized individual access to
the computer; we want this number close to zero. We discuss FNR results here and FPR results in Section 6.3.
SAW detects user intent in two phases. First it detects a user’s intent to authenticate, then it determines whether
the user should be authenticated. We discuss each, next.
6.1.1 Accuracy of Intent Detection on the Wristband. SAW uses an activity classification model to identify a
specific intent action based on the accelerometer and the gyroscope data. During the authentication protocol, the
desktop informs the wristband which intent action it received, and the wristband uses the classifier trained to
identify that intent action. To train a model, we need positive samples (user performing the intent action) as well
as negative samples (user not performing the intent action, i.e., doing other activity). For positive samples, we
used wristband (Shimmer) data when participants performed the intent action. For the negative samples, we
chose wristband data from the activity dataset (Section 5.1).
To test the classifier we used leave-one-out validation: for each participant, the classifier is trained with data
from participants other than the one being tested. This ensures that the model is not specific to the user’s pattern
of performing the intent action. For each participant, we trained the model and then tested it on the participant’s
intent-action wristband data. The average false negative rate (FNR), i.e., failure to identify an intent action, across
all participants, was 0.002 ± 0.003 (mean ± standard deviation) for Tap-5x and 0.009 ± 0.005 for Mouse-Wiggle.
This means that in about 1,000 authentication attempts, SAW failed to detect a user’s Tap-5x intent to authenticate
twice, and the user had to try again.
6.1.2 Accuracy of Authentication. We fed SAW with all positive test cases from our feasibility study and measured
its accuracy in authenticating a user, i.e., identifying user intention on the wristband and successfully correlating
the wristband and desktop data. If the correlation score (c) for a test case was greater than the threshold (τc ),
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Fig. 6. False-negative rate (FNR) for study participants with Mouse-wiggle and Tap-5x interactions.

SAW considered that as a successful correlation and authenticated the user. We evaluated a range of threshold
values by computing the false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR); for our dataset, SAW performed
best (in terms of both FPR and FNR) with τc at 0.7. (A lower threshold reduces FPR but increases FNR, and a
higher threshold reduces FNR but increases FPR.) All the values we report are for τc = 0.7.
The mean FNR, across all participants, was 0.025 (± 0.061) for Tap-5x and was 0.13 (± 0.22) for Mouse-wiggle.
For comparison, password FNR is about 0.079 (± 0.091) for laptop and desktop authentication [34]. Figure 6 shows
the Tap-5x and Mouse-wiggle FNR for individual participants. Mouse-wiggle FNR was high for two participants
in particular, P4 and P11. Inspecting their data, we found that these participants did not wiggle the mouse
side-to-side: P4 moved the mouse arbitrary and P11 did not wiggle the mouse at all. The Mouse-wiggle intent
action does require the user to move the mouse a certain way. With Tap-5x, however, none of our participants
had any similar issues getting their taps recognized; P5 did show a relatively high FNR (0.2) and that is because
she tapped gently with a relatively immobile wrist. We emphasize that in our experiments we did not instruct
participants on how to perform Mouse-wiggle or Tap-5x, because we wanted to evaluate how well SAW performs
for participants without any training and with participants’ natural interaction styles. With Tap-5x, SAW’s FNR
is much lower than that of passwords [34]; as participants learn these intent actions, SAW would perform even
better.
In our feasibility experiments, the Tap-5x authentication interaction proved more quick and accurate than the
Mouse-wiggle action, so we chose Tap-5x as the default authentication action for SAW, and discuss results below
with respect to Tap-5x.

6.2

Usability

Below we evaluate the usability goals we presented in Section 3.1.
6.2.1 No Need to Memorize in SAW. By design, SAW is memoryless – there is no secret for the user to remember.
The user does have to remember to wear the wristband, but once worn the wristband stays with the user. The
goal is minimize the number of password authentications in a day using SAW, but SAW uses password as a
backup authentication method and to activate the wristband, so the user does have to remember the password.
But the user does not have to recall the password as frequently, and there is no need to memorize any new secret.
6.2.2 SAW is Quick. Authentication time in SAW is the sum of communication latency, computation time, and
the time required to perform the intent action. Before an authentication attempt, the desktop and the wristband
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Table 1. Time (in seconds) participants took to complete 30 iterations of each of the three authentication methods; mean
(standard deviation).

Participant

Password

Mouse-based

SAW

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9.7 (7.5)
9.0 (3.1)
8.0 (1.2)
10.8 (3.1)
10.2 (2.3)
7.7 (1.0)
10.2 (5.2)
9.8 (1.8)

3.4 (0.8)
7.7 (4.2)
7.4 (1.3)
5.3 (0.9)
4.4 (1.3)
5.0 (1.6)
4.0 (0.5)
4.6 (0.6)

3.5 (0.4)
4.4 (1.2)
4.5 (0.8)
4.3 (0.4)
3.5 (1.1)
3.5 (0.5)
3.4 (0.4)
3.2 (0.2)

already have established a secure connection, and thereafter communication latency is negligible. In our tests,
computation (performed on a laptop with 8 GB RAM and 2.6 GHz Intel core i7 processor) took at most 500 ms.
Based on the data from the feasibility study, participants took on average of 1.5 s and 4 s to perform Tap-5x and
Mouse-wiggle, respectively. Thus, overall, SAW takes about 2 s with Tap-5x and 4.5 s with Mouse-wiggle. In the
user perception study, however, we found that participants took about 4 seconds to complete Tap-5x, which is
still much less compared to the time they took to type their username and password. Table 1 shows the average
time participants took to complete 30 iterations of the three authentications. Due to an experimental error, we
failed to record data for the other eight participants.
6.2.3 SAW is User Agnostic. A user-agnostic method does not depend on a user’s unique characteristics, e.g.,
in the context of computer use, how she types or how she moves a mouse. User-agnostic methods offer two
advantages: 1) they do not need user-specific training, and 2) they are resilient to changes in user behavior. We
evaluated SAW in a user-agnostic fashion by using leave-one-out validation, that is, when testing SAW for a
participant, we did not use that participant’s data to train any component in SAW. Thus, SAW is user agnostic.
6.2.4 SAW is Low Effort and Easy to Perform. The SUS scores for the passwords, the fictitious mouse-based
authentication method, and the tap-based method (a.k.a. SAW) are shown in Figure 7. Since we used nine questions
in our SUS survey, we report the usability scores out of a total of 90. A higher SUS score indicates that a system is
more usable. Although a majority (11 out of 16) of the participants rated SAW to be more usable than passwords
(median for passwords 70 vs. SAW 75), we see a high variance in the data (means ± std for passwords 69 ± 10 vs.
SAW 71 ± 13). Eleven out of sixteen participants rated SAW more usable than passwords, four rated SAW as less
usable than passwords, and one participant felt both methods were equally usable.
When we probed participants about their ratings, most of the participants who favored SAW said they liked it
because it was quick and easy to perform taps.
“Tapping the space bar was the easiest.” (P10)
“Tap-based method was the fastest for me.” (P16)
Some participants felt SAW was non-intrusive and that it does not require any mental effort.
“It’s very non intrusive. I don’t have to think about authentication.” (P4)
“It is quick and simple. There is no need to watch the screen or keyboard.” (P14)
“I liked the tap-based method because I tap a key 2-4 times to wake-up my computer.” (P15)
A few participants felt that counting taps till five was an effort, and two participants suggested reducing the
number of taps to three from five.
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Fig. 7. System usability scale (SUS) scores for password-based authentication, mouse-based authentication, and SAW.

“I lost track of how many times I tapped.” (P11)
Four participants rated SAW less usable compared to passwords. When inquired, one participant (P6) said he
simply did not like that he would have to wear a wristband. One participant said he liked the convenience of
tapping but he was not confident in the security of the method, and similarly two other participants said tapping
was easier for them, but rated SAW less than passwords in the survey, expressing concerns about the security
of the method. We thus suspect some participant’s concerns about the security of the method were reflected
in the usability survey. This experience suggests that for security-critical systems (or methods) the SUS survey
should be administered carefully, delineating the participants’ security concerns and asking them to focus on the
usability aspects of the system.
Although several participants confessed that performing the mouse-drag movement was simpler, they rated
mouse lower than passwords (and lower than SAW), because they were more comfortable and quick typing than
using a mouse.
“Using the mouse felt like a task to me.” (P2)
We also asked participants to rate how secure they thought SAW and mouse-based method would be compared
to their current method (which was password for everyone). Twelve out of sixteen participants felt SAW was
almost as secure or more than passwords. One participant explained that she felt SAW was more secure because
of the physical device (wristband) that stays with her.
“Having the wristband makes it feel more secure” (P1)
Four participants rated SAW as less secure than passwords; when we inquired, they expressed lack of confidence
in the method.
In summary, majority of our participants liked SAW for its quickness and simplicity, but some participants had
concerns about its security and the burden to wear something. We expect people who already wear a fitness band
or a smartwatch would be willing to use SAW. Getting an objective usability comparison from users between a
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new unfamiliar method and a well established, understood, and regularly used method – passwords – is difficult.
We believe the result that participants rated SAW to be as usable as passwords speaks in favor of SAW.

6.3

Security

By design SAW Requires-explicit-intent (Goal S1) and there is no visible secret information exchanged between
the user and the desktop, so SAW is Resilient-to-physical-observation (Goal S2), unlike passwords, which can be
easily stolen by an observer.
6.3.1 Resilience to Accidental Logins. In this attack, we consider the case that a (victim) user does not wish to
authenticate to any desktop, but she gets logged in to the (adversary’s) target desktop. When the victim user is in
the radio proximity of the target desktop, the adversary attempts to log in as the victim user. When the adversary
provides the intent action, SAW will attempt to authenticate the victim user with the desktop, and send a query to
the victim user’s wristband. Whether the user will be authenticated depends on the victim user’s wrist movement,
which in turns depend on what she is doing when the intent action was performed; she may be walking, sitting,
using another desktop, or doing some other activity. To evaluate precisely this type of scenario we collected
activity data in our experiment. All the test cases for this scenario are negative test cases, generated with D
(desktop inputs) from intent actions performed by participants (as the adversary’s input) and W (wristband data)
from a randomly chosen sample for an activity from the activity dataset (as the victim user’s wrist movement). In
total, we generated 3,000 negative test cases.
We first evaluated these negative test cases with the wristband intent detector and if the intent detector labeled
any test case as positive, we evaluated those with the correlator. The intent detector’s FPR for sitting, walking,
and other activity was zero, 0.013, and 0.151, respectively. Overall, the intent detector correctly identified 85%
of the test cases as negative, i.e., it correctly identified that the victim user did not intend to authenticate in
85% of the cases. About 15% of the wristband samples during walking and other activities were misclassified by
the intent detector as valid intent actions, but these 15% test cases were identified as negative by the correlator,
producing zero FPR for this attack in our experiments.
6.3.2 Resilience to Mimicking Attack. A majority of the accidental login attack test cases failed (from the
adversary’s perspective) due to the intent detector, which emphasize SAW’s Requires-explicit-intent design
goal. This design goal raises the bar for an adversary, because now the adversary not only has to account for
the user’s presence but also for the user’s wrist movements. In a mimicking attack, the victim user is near the
(adversary’s) target desktop and is attempting to log in to a different desktop, while the adversary times his intent
action to match and mimic with the victim user’s intent action.
Before we evaluate this scenario, let us see how SAW works in a multi-user multi-desktop setting. Consider a
scenario with two users, Alice and Bob, who want to log in to desktops D1 and D2, respectively. Both Alice and
Bob are authorized users of both the desktops. When they attempt to log in at the same time, D1 sends out a
query to nearby wristbands and receives data from Alice and Bob’s wristband, and attempts to identify which of
the two attempted to log in; and D2 does the same thing. As long as the time delay between when Alice and Bob
performed their authentication interaction is more than 50 msec, D1 can easily distinguish them. But if Alice and
Bob performed authentication interactions at the same time (or within 50 msec) – an unlikely case – there is a
possibility that D1’s correlation scores for Alice and Bob are above the threshold and D1 cannot decide which of
the two is its current user. In this dilemma (an “authentication collision”) D1 simply refuses to authenticate either
user, and asks its current user (Alice) to try again. Alternatively, authentication collision can happen for the
wristband: D2 and D1 may fail to authenticate Bob, but Alice might pass the correlation threshold on D1 and D2,
in which case, Alice’s wristband must decide which of the two desktops Alice is using – the wristband can only
authenticate to one desktop at a time. In this situation, Alice’s wristband rejects authentication from D1 and D2,
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Fig. 8. False-positive rate (FPR) and False-negative rate (FNR) for the mimic attack case, where an adversary attempts to
spoof the user by mimicking her actions; FPR should be low in attack scenarios.

and D1 will ask its current user (Alice) to authenticate again. We expect such collisions in authentication attempts
are unlikely in real life, so having to retry again in such situations is not a significant trade-off for usability.
The mimicking attack scenario is similar to the above case, except that Bob is an adversary who wears no
wristband and is not an authorized user of D2 (the target desktop). Using the interaction data from our user study,
we generate test cases for this scenario as follows. For the negative test case, we use W (wristband data) from a
participant, say Alice (in the role of the victim user) and D (desktop data) from another participant, say Bob (in
the role of the adversary), and we align the timestamps so both the data streams begin at the same time, as if
Bob timed his desktop inputs to match perfectly with Alice’s; and for the positive test case, we use W and D
from Alice. We repeat this experiment for each participant in the role of victim user and a different participant
(selected at random) in the role of adversary.
Figure 8 shows the average FPR and FNR for each participant as Alice. SAW achieves a low FPR of 0.018 (±
0.036) across all participants for the mimicking attack. The FNR rate, however, is high (more than 0.5), and this is
because resetting the timestamps in the test cases caused collisions in authentication for the victim user – she
was being authenticated on two desktops, the target desktop and her own desktop – and the victim’s wristband
denied authentication to her on both desktops in that attempt. For an attack scenario, we want a low false-positive
rate (which SAW achieves) and preferably a low false-negative rate, but a high false-negative rate is acceptable
because such attack scenarios are unlikely in practice – in real settings we expect at least a few seconds difference
between the two individual’s login attempts.
By aligning the timestamps we evaluate SAW’s performance for an adversary who is a perfect mimicker. This
is a stress test for SAW because in practice it is difficult for an adversary to imitate others in real time. Prior work
on mimic attacks on gait and keystroke biometrics suggest that humans can imitate others with limited success,
but under certain conditions (e.g., not in real time, mimicker and target both have similar physical characteristics,
the mimic task is simple) and with significant training [29, 38]. In SAW the adversary needs to react within 50 ms,
and given that the average human reaction time is about 215 ms [26, 47, 55], mimicking SAW’s intent action in
real time is difficult.
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If an adversary does manage to mimic a victim user, then the user’s wristband intent action would correlate
with two desktops – the desktop the user is attempting to use and the target desktop on which the adversary is
mimicking the user – resulting in an authentication collision, and the wristband will deny authentication on both
the desktops. An adversary who can cause wireless interference can block communication between the victim
user’s wristband and her desktop at the right moment to avoid authentication collision and log in to the target
desktop as the victim user. In that case, the victim user would be notified on her wristband that she logged in to a
desktop (Step 5 in the protocol, Section 4.2), allowing her to track down the desktop and take action, reducing
the attack window.
6.3.3 Protocol Analysis. SAW uses SlyFi [19], a secure communication protocol, for desktop-wristband communication and relies on SlyFi’s security guarantees against message replay, message spoofing, and man-in-the-middle
attacks. As describe in Section 4.2, the desktop and the wristband bootstrap their session by sharing session
keys. Because the desktop uses a different session key for each wristband, the desktop can verify the message
source, which prevents multi-session attacks where a message or a part of the message from one session is used
in another session.
An adversary may selectively jam one or more messages in the protocol to gain advantage in spoofing the user,
but the SAW protocol is secure against message failures in the protocol. If the desktop does not receive a valid
message from the wristband in each step of the protocol, the desktop aborts the authentication protocol, and the
user has to try again. Furthermore, because the desktop does not log in a user until it receives a confirmation ACK
from the user’s wristband (Step 6 in the protocol), the wristband is always aware where (on which desktop) the
user is (or could be) logged in. This confirmation step prevents the case where an adversary manages to spoof the
user but blocks messages to the wristband to keep the wristband notifying the user that she has been logged in.
In SAW’s threat model, an adversary can be an authorized user of the desktop, i.e., he can have a SAW wristband
and can participate in the authentication protocol. By participating in an on-going authentication protocol, such
an adversary learns the type and time of the intent action performed on the desktop, but this information does not
give the adversary any advantage to spoof the user in this particular on-going authentication attempt, because the
intent action has already been performed and the adversary cannot change the desktop input at this point. (SAW
uses three inputs to verify a user: proximity range (to verify that the user is within range), desktop input, and
wristband motion data. To spoof a user, the adversary can only control proximity range and the desktop input.)
The adversary, however, could use the intent type and time information to learn about the user’s preference
for intent action and pattern, which may help the adversary better mimic the user in future spoofing attempts.
That said, this information could also be gained by physically observing the user while she authenticates, so the
protocol does not leak any additional information about the user.

6.4

Feedback from Hospital Staff

To get feedback on SAW from users in a hospital setting, we conducted two short (about 30 min each) informal
focus groups at a local hospital; one with a group of five clinicians, and another with a group of five IT staff
members and one clinician. Scheduling interviews with hospital staff was challenging due to their busy schedules,
and conducting usability studies in the hospital was logistically infeasible. So we resorted to seeking feedback
through focus-group style meetings, during which we demonstrated SAW with a prototype, explained how
authentication works in SAW, and asked for feedback and questions.
All participants really liked that SAW used a wrist wearable as the authentication token, primarily because
they saw a wrist wearable as a better design than keycards that users forget all the time. Once worn, wristbands
are likely to stay with (on) the user, unlike keycards or other tokens that people have to carry in their pockets or
purses, which are likely to be left behind. In SAW, the authentication token stays “tethered to their [users] wrist,”
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as one of IT staff put it. Our design choice to explore authentication based on a wrist wearable was in part due to
similar feedback (around forgetting cards) that we received during our early conversations with the hospital staff.
One concern clinicians had about the wearable design was “is it washable?” According to them, wristbands
should be water and alcohol resistant, basically resistant to all the chemicals that clinicians hands are frequently
exposed to. One surgical clinician reported “my rubber wristband eroded because of all the washing [with chemicals].”
Thus, the wristband may need to be made water/alcohol proof or removed before washing and in certain
procedures (such as surgery or any other area requiring scrubbing), but we note that it is common for clinicians
and nurses to wear a wristband (or watch), at least in the U.S. In countries (e.g., U.K., Australia) where hospitals
use a ‘bare below the elbows’ policy and do not allow any jewelry below elbows, SAW may not be appropriate.
That said, we anticipate SAW can be useful in a wide range of enterprise settings, not just hospitals.
Participants, especially clinicians, liked that the authentication was fast and did not need any password or
secret PIN. The IT staff was keen to leverage the token for automatic deauthentication, i.e., automatically logging
out users when they leave a workstation, which was one of their main security challenges; SAW can easily support
automatic deauthentication based on user’s step count after log in. Clinicians asked how SAW would authenticate
when they forget their wristband, and they found the strategy of using passwords as backup authentication
acceptable. A requirement that one clinician raised was the ability to have read-only access to a workstation from
far away. His particular use case was to be able to watch a graph or a particular screen as he walked by, and he
found “having to login/logout just for that is annoying.” Instead of logging out a user, putting the workstation
in read-only mode (with appropriate measures to protect patient privacy) could be a solution to address this
particular use case.

7

DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS

Here we discuss important issues related to the feasibility of deploying SAW in a real system, some limitations of
SAW, and areas of future work.
Identity and Securing Wristband to User. SAW does not identify a wristband wearer or provide resilience
to theft. However, fitness wristbands and smartwatches are considered personal wearable devices usually intended
to be worn more or less continuously and are less likely to be shared with others and hence are more likely
to be kept under close control by their owners. Furthermore, smartwatch manufacturers could securely link
smartwatches to users (to prevent theft and unintended sharing) by adding simple methods to detect when the
user takes off the smartwatch and requiring her to enter a PIN when she puts the smartwatch on (as in the Apple
Watch for example) or using a biometric to identify the user when she puts on the smartwatch [14].
When using motion data from a user’s wristband, there are potential privacy concerns because the user’s
activity or what she typed can be inferred using the motion data [54]. Such privacy concerns, however, can be
mitigated by processing the motion data locally on the wristband [46] and sharing only the processed data, as
SAW does.
Energy Consumption on Wristband. The energy consumption of the accelerometer, gyroscope and radio
on the wristband will determine the recharging interval, with longer times being preferable. Using hardware and
software optimizations, a wristband running SAW could last days if not weeks on a single charge. Gyroscopes
use more power (e.g., the STMicroelectronics L3GD20H draws 5mA), but the ADXL362 (and many other low
power accelerometers) has an extremely low power motion-activated wake-up mode (270 nanoAmps) that could
be used to keep both sensors and the radio off until motion above a preset threshold is detected. Low-energy
radios such as Bluetooth Low Energy can run for months on a button-sized battery and the radio could be used
both as a test for rough proximity to the computer terminal and to wake the sensors when proximity is achieved.
Together, methods such as these should provide a battery life for a wristband of weeks, and as a background task
on a smartwatch similarly consume little power.
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Limitations. One of the main limitations of SAW is that Bluetooth, which is the most ubiquitous wireless
protocol for personal area networks, was not designed for complex network topologies. As a result, pairing
multiple desktops with a single wristband, or more generally, multiple devices with multiple wristbands, can be
challenging. This limitation is not fundamental; there are existing ultra-low power wireless protocols (such as
ANT+ and TI’s SimpleLink) that support many-to-many connectivity in high-density environments. Bluetooth
Low Energy, however, does not require pairing, and indeed, supports some broadcast operations (e.g., those
used for iBeacon and Eddystone protocols). The Bluetooth SIG Smart Mesh Working Group is currently working
to develop low-energy Bluetooth smart-mesh networking support [10]. These features should migrate into
commercial smartwatches in the near future. Smartwatches support Wi-Fi as well, which may meet the needs of
SAW since radio interactions with the terminal may only occur over a small portion of each day.

8

RELATED WORK

We present a comparative evaluation of SAW and other authentication methods using the UDS evaluation
framework [11]. In the UDS framework, a set of usability and security properties (called ‘benefits’) are defined,
and each authentication scheme is rated as either offering or not offering the benefit; if a scheme almost offers
the benefit, but not quite, it is indicated with the Quasi- prefix. For our evaluation, we use the following thirteen
benefits (seven usability and six security; denoted with U and S), drawn from the UDS framework and our design
goals; for UDS benefits, we use the UDS definition.
U1 Memorywise-Effortless: Users of the scheme do not have to remember any secret at all.
U2 Nothing-to-Carry: Users do not have to carry any additional physical object to use the scheme. We grant
Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry if the object is something that they would carry everywhere all the time anyways,
e.g., wristband, smartwatch, or a phone.
U3 Physically-Effortless: The authentication process does not require physical (as opposed to cognitive) user
effort beyond, say, pressing a button. Schemes that do not offer this benefit include those that require
typing, scribbling or performing a set of motions. We grant Quasi-Physically-Effortless if the user’s effort is
limited to speaking, on the basis that even illiterate people find that natural to do.
U4 Easy-to-Learn: Users who do not know the scheme can figure it out and learn it without too much trouble,
and then easily recall how to use it.
U5 Efficient-to-Use: The time users must spend for each authentication is acceptably short.
U6 Easy-Recovery-from-Loss: Users can conveniently regain the ability to authenticate if the token is lost or
the credentials forgotten.
U7 User-Agnostic: The scheme does not depend on users’ individual characteristics. Biometric and behavioral
schemes do not offer this benefit.
S1 Resilient-to-Physical-Observation: An attacker cannot impersonate users after observing them authenticate
one or more times. Attacks include shoulder surfing, filming the keyboard, recording keystroke sounds, or
thermal imaging of keypad.
S2 Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers: Nothing that a verifier could possibly leak can help an attacker
impersonate the user to another verifier. This penalizes schemes where insider fraud at one provider, or a
successful attack on one back-end, endangers the user’s accounts at other sites.
S3 Resilient-to-Phishing: An attacker who simulates a valid verifier cannot collect credentials that can later be
used to impersonate the user to the actual verifier.
S4 Resilient-to-Theft: If the scheme uses a physical object for authentication, the object cannot be used for
authentication by another person who gains possession of it. We still grant Quasi-Resilient-to-Theft if the
protection is achieved with the modest strength of a PIN.
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S5 Requiring-Explicit-Intent: The authentication process cannot be started without the explicit consent of the
user.
S6 Resilient-to-Relay-Attacks: An attacker cannot break the scheme using simple range-extending or relay
attacks.
Benefits User-Agnostic and Resilient-to-Relay-Attacks are based on SAW’s design goals (Section 3.1) and the
other benefits are based on the UDS framework. Below we discuss related work and rate them for these benefits;
Table 2 shows a summary of our comparative evaluation.
Table 2. Comparative evaluation of SAW and other authentication schemes.

Resilient-to-Relay-Attacks

Require-Explicit-Intent

Resilient-to-Theft

Resilient-to-Phishing

Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers

Resilient-to-Physical-Observation

User-Agnostic

Security

Easy-Recovery-from-Loss

Efficient-to-Use

Easy-to-Learn

Physically-Effortless

Nothing-to-Carry

Memorywise-Effortless

Scheme

References

Usability

SAW
ZEBRA
[35]
Passwords
Proximity-based
Using NFC or Bluetooth [6]
Biometric
Fingerprint
[48]
Voice
[2]
Face
[3]
= offers the benefit;
= better than SAW;

8.1

= almost offers the benefit; no circle = does not offer the benefit.
= worse than SAW; no pattern = equivalent to SAW.

ZEBRA

SAW builds on the bilateral authentication concept we introduced in our prior work on continuous authentication,
ZEBRA [35]. In bilateral authentication the user’s interaction with a desktop is observed by two parties – the
desktop and the user’s wristband – who then compare their observations to verify that the interaction to the
desktop indeed came from the wristband’s wearer. Although both SAW and ZEBRA authenticate by correlating
user’s wrist movements with desktop inputs, the key differences in the choice of the authentication interaction and
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correlation techniques makes one (SAW) suitable for initial authentication and the other (ZEBRA) for continuous
authentication. ZEBRA authenticates a user by comparing a sequence of interactions, where interactions are
classified into three types: Typing (user typing on the keyboard), Scrolling (user scrolling the mouse), and
MKKM (user switching between mouse and keyboard). The desktop converts the user’s input (to keyboard and
mouse) into a sequence of these three interactions – for example, TTMS, for Typing–Typing–MKKM–Scrolling.
(In a sequence, each interaction is limited at most 1 s long duration; a longer interaction is split into small duration
interactions of same type.) The user’s wristband – based on the user’s wrist movement – produces a corresponding
sequence of interactions that it predicts the user performed, say TTMT (in this case, the wristband inferred the
last interaction incorrectly). ZEBRA compares the two sequences and if the majority of the interactions match,
the user is authenticated. This is a coarse-grained correlation, because all typing interactions are considered the
same (similarly, all scrolling actions are considered the same and all MKKM interactions are considered the same);
and matching of two sequences is done by majority, without any penalty for mis-matched interactions in the
sequences. One drawback of this coarse-grained correlation is the possibility of a spoofing using a relay attack
from an opportunistic human observer [23], because ZEBRA cannot distinguish between two typing interactions.
Another drawback of ZEBRA is the time required for an authentication decision: as the paper reports, ZEBRA
performs best with sequences of 20 or more interactions, which means it can take up to 20 s to authenticate the
user. Thus, ZEBRA is not suitable for initial authentication, i.e., to unlock a computer, which is why it relies on
an existing method to unlock the desktop.
Unlike ZEBRA, SAW authenticates a user based on just one interaction, tapping or mouse-wiggle interaction
(called Tap-5x or Mouse-wiggle, respectively). SAW performs correlation using key moments in the interaction,
which enables it do fine-grained correlation and distinguish between two different instances of the same interaction
(e.g., Tap-5x performed at different times by same user, or at same time by different users). For tapping (Tap-5x),
SAW looks at individual keystrokes and matches them with wrist movement based on the keystroke timings; for
mouse wiggle (Mouse-wiggle), SAW looks at the changes in mouse direction and compares them with the changes
in wrist movements. This fine-grained correlation allows SAW to authenticate a user just after a few keyboard or
mouse inputs, authenticating users quickly, within 2 s. SAW thereby addresses both the challenges that make
ZEBRA unsuitable for initial authentication. Because both SAW and ZEBRA use a wristband, they are actually
complementary to each other – SAW does initial authentication and ZEBRA does continuous authentication; a
user can authenticate to a desktop using SAW, and once authenticated, ZEBRA could continuously verify the
user’s presence with its continuous authentication method.
ZEBRA is Memorywise-Effortless, Easy-to-Learn, User-Agnostic, and it offers Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry and QuasiEasy-Recovery-from-Loss. Because there is no secret shared during authentication, ZEBRA is resilient to physical
observations, leaks from other verifies, and phishing, but offers only Quasi-Resilient-to-Theft because a wristband
can be stolen. Because using a desktop conveys user’s intent, ZEBRA offers Requiring-Explicit-Intent and Resilientto-Relay-Attacks, but it is susceptible to simple mimicking attacks [23]. Compared to SAW, ZEBRA is not PhysicallyEffortless and Efficient-to-Use because a user has to type and move a mouse for 10 s to 20 s to authenticate.

8.2

Password-based Methods

Passwords are the most commonly used authentication method for desktop computers. Passwords are not
Memorywise-Effortless. They offer Nothing-to-Carry, but are not Physically-Effortless as passwords need to be typed.
Passwords are Easy-to-Learn and Efficient-to-Use, and they offer Easy-Recovery-from-Loss as they can be easily
reset. They are User-Agnostic because they do not depend on either physiological or behavioral characteristics of
a user. Passwords are not Resilient-to-Physical-Observation as they can be easily captured by shoulder surfing [52]
or by filming [7], and for the same reason (i.e., they can be easily stolen) they are also not Resilient-to-Theft. They
are not Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers if the user has same password for different computers. They are
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also not Resilient-to-Phishing as the attacker can use the obtained password to impersonate the user. They offer
Requiring-Explicit-Intent as users have to enter their passwords to authenticate, and are Resilient-to-Relay-Attacks
assuming that the adversary cannot tamper with the target desktop to intercept and relay the password.

8.3

Proximity-based Methods

In proximity-based authentication methods, a user carries a wireless authentication token and whenever the
token is within a certain distance of the target computer, the user is authenticated. Commonly used proximity
tokens include NFC cards, smartwatches [4], wristbands [42], rings [41], or smartphones [32]. Different tokens
provide different affordances. NFC cards are flexible to carry (in a pocket or on a lanyard) and do not need
charging, but they are also easy to lose or forget; lost (or stolen) cards present security risk because they still
allow access as the user (until they are reported as lost and deactivated). Smartphones are less likely to be left
behind and the user need not carry a separate token, but they can be inconvenient to be used as tokens if the
user has to take her phone out of pocket or purse and unlock the phone to authenticate. Wearable tokens (watch,
wristband, ring) offer better security, because, once worn, they stay with the user and they can be designed to
detect when they are taken off so that they can be deactivated. In terms of deployment, a NFC-based solution
requires issuing a (low-cost) card per user, but it also requires issuing a NFC reader per desktop; whereas SAW
does not require any additional hardware on the desktop, but it does require a wristband per user (or could be
incorporated in wristbands or smartwatches that users would use anyways).
As discussed before, the commonly used protocols in proximity-based methods are susceptible to relay
attacks (NFC, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi). There are secure distance-bounding techniques that are difficult to fool [45],
but those techniques require special hardware, which is not common in consumer desktops and laptops. Apple’s
auto unlock method uses both Bluetooth and Wi-Fi as a defense against relay attacks, but it requires a special
Wi-Fi chipset (802.11v compatible) [5]. In SAW, there is no need for any special hardware on the desktop or in
the wristband (assuming both already have either Bluetooth or a standard Wi-Fi radio).
Proximity-based methods are Memorywise-Effortless, Physically-Effortless, Easy-to-Learn and Efficient-to-Use. We
rate them Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry because the proximity tokens can be integrated in smartwatches or smartphones,
and Quasi-Easy-Recovery-from-Loss because tokens are not as easy to recover as passwords, but can be recovered by
buying another token. These methods are Resilient-to-Physical-Observation, Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers,
and Resilient-to-Phishing, but they are not Resilient-to-Relay-Attacks. These methods are Quasi-Resilient-to-Theft
because the tokens can be secured with a PIN, but they do not offer Requiring-Explicit-Intent as the user is
authenticated whenever she is in the proximity of the device, without any consent.

8.4

Biometric-based Methods

Biometric authentication methods are Memorywise-Effortless, Nothing-to-Carry, and generally Easy-to-Learn and
Efficient-to-Use, but they do present certain challenges: they are easy to steal (do not offer Resilient-to-Theft) and
difficult to revoke (do not offer Easy-Recovery-from-Loss). They are also not Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers
and Resilient-to-Phishing as the leaked or stolen credentials can be used to authenticate as the user. Biometric
methods, by design, are not User-Agnostic. Fingerprint-based methods are Physically-Effortless as with modern
fingerprint sensors providing a fingerprint is as easy as pressing a key. They are Resilient-to-Physical-Observation
because (unlike voice or face) fingerprints are hard to capture by observing or filming the user. They offer
Requiring-Explicit-Intent as the act of providing a fingerprint conveys user consent.
Voice-based authentication schemes are Quasi-Physically-Effortless as speaking is not as easy as pressing a
key, but it is natural to most users. We rate voice-based methods as not offering Requiring-Explicit-Intent and
Resilient-to-Relay-Attacks as voice can be synthesized [39], replayed, or relayed. Unlike fingerprint or voice,
face-based schemes are Physically-Effortless as the user simply has to be in the view of the camera, and because
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this is a better indication of intent to use a device than simply being in proximity of the device, we rate them as
Quasi-Require-Intentionality.

9

CONCLUSION

In this paper we present SAW, a new authentication method that allows users to authenticate by simply tapping
a key multiple times or wiggling the mouse – a simple, natural interaction. Through in-lab user studies, we
explored SAW’s feasibility and users’ perception about SAW’s usability and security. From our user studies,
SAW proved to be quick, authenticating participants within 2 s; effortless, and several participants liked the
natural tap authentication interaction; usable, with a low false-negative rate of 2.5%; and secure, with a low
false-positive rate of 1.8% even in the most advantageous conditions for an adversary. In comparison, passwords
are burdensome and error-prone, with error rates (false-negative rate) as high as 7.9% for laptop and desktop
authentications. We envision SAW – with its low false-negative rate and seamless authentication – to augment
password-based methods, and reduce the number of times people have to enter passwords. Because SAW also
supports seamless authentication for multiple users, it is particularly useful in multi-user shared environments
where the authentication burden on users is high (e.g., hospitals, enterprise environments).
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